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VOL. II JUNE, 1948 No. 4
SOME INCIDENTAL PROBLEMS IN THE TAXATION
OF ANNUITY CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LAW.
ROBERT MEISENHOLDER'
A PREVIOUS article on the taxation of commercial
annuity contracts under the federal income tax dealt
with various problems in the taxation of periodical pay-
ments and death benefit payments under such policies.
In addition to such types of payments, there are also mis-
cellaneous gains and losses realized in transactions in-
volving these contracts. Although they are of less common
occurrence, certain problems which have arisen in connec-
tion with the taxation of these miscellaneous transactions
merit some critical examination.
1. Taxation of Proceeds Received Upon Surrender of
Annuity Contracts.
Ordinarily, simple life annuity contracts, temporary life
annuity contracts, refund annuity contracts, annuities
certain, and joint and survivor annuity contracts do not
contain surrender features' whether they are immediate
or deferred. 2 Of the other types of annuity contracts "re-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami; A. B. University of South
Dakota, 1939; J. D. University of Michigan, 1939; S. J. D. University of
Michigan, 1942.
1 Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts under Federal Income
Tax, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 1005 (1942).
2 A simple life annuity contract is one in which the insurance company
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tirement contracts", and "insurance with annuity" con-
promises periodical payments to the annuitant for the duration of his
life (occasionally for the duration of some third person's life).
A temporary life annuity contract is one in which the insurance
company promises to make the periodical payments to the annuitant
for a specified period only, or until the prior death of the annuitant.
Neither of the above types include death benefit provisions.
Refund annuity contracts guarantee a minimum return of the con-
sideration paid. Should the annuitant die before the total amount of
payments made to him equal the premium paid, the company prom-
ises to continue the payments to a named beneficiary until their total
amount equals the consideration.
Annuities certain are somewhat similar to refund annuity contracts.
They provide for a guaranteed number of payments irrespective of the
death of the measuring life, to be continued to a beneficiary upon the
premature death of the annuitant before all of the guaranteed payments
are received.
Joint and survivor annuity contracts provide for annuity payments
to two or more persons jointly during their lifetime, the payments to
continue to the survivors or survivor for life.
The above types of annuities may be immediate-to take effect upon
the payment of a single premium, or deferred-to take effect at some
time after payment of a single premium or to take effect after payment
of premium in installments over a period of time. For more detailed
explanation of these types of contracts and variations of these types
of contracts see article cited in note 1 and Meisenholder, Taxation of
Annuity Contracts Under Estate and Inheritance Taxes, 39 Mich. L.
Rev. 856 (1941).
Sometimes refund contracts and annuities certain contain a provision
that the annuitant may receive a surrender value. This surrender value
is In force only so long as the total payments made to the annuitant do
not equal or exceed the consideration paid, and it usually consists of the
commuted value of the guaranteed payments that have not been paid
at the time of surrender (occasionally less a surrender charge). Unless
the contract is a participating contract, there will be no gain over cost
realized if the amount is received in a lump sum.
if an optional type of periodical payment is available and chosen upon
surrender, such payments would be treated as are payments under
similar options available to purchasers or beneficiaries of endowment
contracts. These options are discussed in Meisenholder, Taxation of
Annuity Contracts Under Federal Income Tact, 40 Mich. L. Rev.
1005 at 1031-1032 (1942). Present governmental rulings, as mentioned
there, distinguish between periodic payments which will be equal to
or less than interest and earnings on the proceeds left with the com-
pany. The former type payments are treated as annuity payments and
taxed by the usual three per cent method under Section 22 (see note 7,
infra) and the latter type of payments are considered income in their
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tracts, may involve some difficulties.3
However, upon surrender of "annuity with death bene-
fit" contracts and of insurance and annuity policies where
the insurance policy will be issued only with the annuity
policy, it may well be that the taxpayer will realize a gain.'
entirety. However, since the publication of the above article a case in
the Tax Court and two other cases have followed the principle that
only periodical payments under endowment insurance policies involv-
ing an annuity risk to the company based on actuarial life expectancy
principles should be considered as annuity payments and so taxed under
Section 22. Apparently under this view, other types of periodical pay-
ments under annuity contracts which amount merely to repayment of
principal plus interest and earnings on principal will not be taxed until
consideration is repaid. Payments amounting to interest payments will
be entirely taxable. See Thornley v. Commissioner, 2 T. C, 220 (1943);
Hess v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 135 (D.C. Minn,, 1947); and Helver-
ing v. Meredith, 140 F. 2d 973. A non-acquiescence had been entered
in the Thornley decision. But a proposed amendment of Sec. 29, 22(b)
(2)-2 of Regulation III provides that amounts received under an
annuity contract as an annuity. shall mean periodical payments based
on life expectancy and mortality tables. This will put into effect the
second view mentioned above.
See also Blum v. Higgins, 150 F. 2d 471, (C.C.A;' 2d, 1945), holding
that when a taxpayer receives proceeds of an endowment policy under
option to receive interest payments on principal left with the insurance
company with the right to withdraw principal on any interest date, he
is in constructive receipt of the principal.
3 "Retirement annuity contracts" is the term used here to designate
various modified types of deferred annuities. They provide for periodic
payments to the annuitant if he survives the deferred period in the form
of a life annuity, refund annuity, annuity certain, or joint and survivor
annuity, or variations thereof (at the election of the annuitant). They
may usually be surrendered before maturity (during the deferred
period). Here again the surrender value is never greater than the con-
sideration paid, and there will be no gain If the amount at surrender is
received In a lump sum unless the contract is a participating one. If the
amount is paid in periodical payments the comments in the last para-
graph of note 2 apply.
'Insurance with annuity" contracts are contracts issued on an install-
ment premium basis providing for an annuity at a certain age to an
"annuitant" or "insured," but if the death of the insured (who may not
be an annuitant) occurs during the deferred period, a face amount named
in the policy or an increasing cash surrender value (whichever is higher)
will be paid to a beneficiary. Amounts received upon surrender are to
b. treated as similar amounts under "retirement" contracts.
4 "Annuity with death benefit" contracts are contracts in which the
insurance company agrees to pay a named beneficiary upon the death
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There is a 1940 ruling that the entire amount of periodic
payments under such contracts shall be considered as in-
come (prior to surrender), and although this ruling is
supported by a recent Tax Court Case, there are also
several other cases' which point to the conclusion that such
payments are to be treated as annuity payments and taxed
as such under Section 22(b) (2) of the Internal Revenue
Code.' Thus it may be that when existing policies are sur-
rendered, the amount received plus untaxed periodical pay-
ments or untaxed portions thereof previously received will
of the "insured" or "annuitant" a face amount usually slightly less than
the amount of a single cash premium. Until the "annuitant" dies he is
paid guaranteed periodical payments approximating from two to five
per cent of the amount of the death benefit. Thus the annuity and
death benefit features are in force concurrently. There is a constant cash
surrender value to an amount equaling or approximating the death
benefit in force until the death of the annuitant.
The above plan, embodied in one contract, is varied by a plan under
which two policies are issued-a single-premium whole-life insurance
policy issued only with a single-premium immediate life annuity. As
in the case of an annuity with death benefit, the policies are issued on a
non-medical basis. It is required that the total purchase price of both
policies shall be about ten per cent greater than the face amount of the
insurance. When an insurance with death benefit policy is surrendered,
the entire policy is usually cancelled, but in the instant transaction, the
insurance policy alone may be surrendered leaving the annuity policy
in force. The surrender values are increasing values, but less than in an
ordinary single premium insurance policy. See article cited in note 1
and Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts under Estate and
Inheritance Taxes, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 856 at 878-880 for further descrip-
tion of the above types of contracts.
S G. C. M. 21716, 1940-1 Cum. Bull. 82; Igleheart v. Commissioner,
10 T. C. 103 (1948).
6 Bodine v. Commissioner, 103 F. 2d 982 (C.C.A. 3d, 1919), (an-
nuity with death benefit); Commissioner v. Meyer, 139 F. 2d 256 (C.C.A.
6th, 1943) (separate insurance and annuity policies issued in one
transaction). Bee also Helvering v. Meredith, 140 F. 2d 973 (C.C.A.
8th, 1944). These cases hold that the annuity feature should be con-
sidered separately from the insurance feature and therefore that the
periodical payments should be considered annuities under Section 22
(b) (2) of t'he INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (see note 7). As indicated in
Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts Under Federal Income
Tax, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1005 at 1033-1037 (1942), these decisions are
questionable. The decisions cited in the last paragraph of note 2, supra,
also have some bearing on this problem.
7 Section 22 (b) (2), INTERNAL REVENUE CODE provides: "Amounts
[VOL,. 2
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exceed the consideration paid for the policies. In such case
the taxpayer would realize a gain.8
In order to obtain a reduction of taxes it has been con-
tended unsuccessfully that Section 117 of the Internal
Revenue Code governs the treatment of such gains real-
ized upon the surrender of annuity with death benefit
contracts, as well as upon surrender of insurance con-
tracts.9
While amounts received upon surrender of contracts
which are admittedly annuity, endowment, or life insur-
ance contracts are to be taxed according to Section 22 (b)
(2), the contention has been made that such amounts are
gains "upon the sale or exchange of a capital asset" and
are not to be included directly in gross income,' 0 or con-
stitute "amounts received by the holder upon the retire-
ment of bonds, debentures, notes, or certificates or other
received as an annuity under an annuity or endowment contract shall
be included in gross income; except that there shall be excluded from
gross income the excess of the amount received in the taxable year over
an amount equal to 3 per centum of the aggregate premiums or con-
sideration paid for such annuity (whether or not paid during such year),
until the aggregate amount excluded from gross income under this
chapter or prior income tax laws in respect of such annuity equals the
aggregate premiums or consideration paid for such annuity."
8 If the amount is not paid In a lump sum but in some form of per-
iodical payment, the periodical payments should be treated as such
payments when received under an endowment contract. See note 2,
supra.
9 Blum v. Higgins, 150 F. 2d 471 (C.C.A. 2d 1945) (endowment
insurance contracts); Avery v. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 19 (C.C.A. 9th
1940) (endowment insurance contracts); Bodine v. Commissioner, 103
F. 2d 982 (C.C.A. 3d 1939) (annuity with death benefit contract):
Cobb v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 642 (1939) (annuity with death benefit
contract) appeal dismissed, 111 F. 2d 644 (C.C.A. 9th 1940); Hellman
v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 901 (1936) (annuity with death benefit
contract). G.C.M. 18233, XVI-1 Cum. Bull. 147 (1937); I. T. 2661,
XI-2 Cum. Bull. 39 (1932) are pertinent rulings. See also Ralph Perkins
v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 1225 (1940), affd., 125 F. 2d 150 (C.C.A.
6th 1942), for ruling on insurance policy.
10 Section 117(b), INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: "In the case of a taxpayer,
other than a corporation, only the following percentages of the gain
or loss recognized upon the sale or exchange of a capital asset shall be
taken into account in computing net capital gain, net capital loss or
net income . . .
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evidences of indebtedness issued by any corporation ...,
with interest coupons or in registered form."1' The basic
feeling behind these views is that the receipt of such
amounts involves a capital transaction with a transfer of
assets in an "investment" situation.
Soon after the adoption of the provisions specifically
dealing with the taxation of capital gains and losses it was
ruled by the government that amounts received upon the
redemption of bonds were not amounts received upon the
sale or exchange of property and that any gain in such
transactions was therefore to be considered ordinary in-
come.' 2 The Board of Tax Appeals in 1929, however, held
to the opposite effect in the case of bonds to be called at
the 'option of the issuer,'" and the government changed its
ruling to accord with that decision.' 4 In 1932 the Board of
Tax Appeals reversed its decision,'5 and a new depart-
mental ruling was published.'6 Then in 1934 the present
Section 117(f) was enacted disposing of the problem as it
related to the retirement of bonds.
In cases since 1934, but arising under the revenue acts
prior to 1934, conflicting decisions were reached concerning
the treatment of the redemption of bonds upon maturity
or at the call of the issuer.' Finally, the Supreme Court
decided in the Fairbanks case that the gains from such
11 Section 117(f), INTERNAL REVENUE CODE: "For the purposes of this
chapter, amounts received by the holder upon the retirement of bonds,
debentures, notes or certificates, or other evidences of indebtedness,
Issued by any corporation (including those issued by a government or
political subdivision thereof), with interest coupons or in registered
form, shall be considered as amounts received in exchange therefor."
12 1. T. 1637, 11-2 Cum. Bull. 36 (1923).
'3 Werner v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 482 (1929) (bonds called in by
corporation).
141. T. 2488, VIII-2 Cune. Bull. 127 (1929).
15Watson v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 463 (1932) (bonds paid at
maturity).
16 1. T. 2678, XII-1 Cur. Bull. 117 (1933).
17Averill v. Commissioner, 101 F. 2d 644 (C.C.A. lst 1938). The
Court held that the gain upon the surrender of bonds at maturity was
a gain resulting from the exchange or sale of capital assets under
Sections 101 (a) and (c) of the Revenue Act of 1928. The redemption
of the bonds was conceived to be a sale of a specialty. Emphasis was
also placed upon the view that Section 117 (f) of the Revenue Act of
[VOL. 2
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transactions were not gains derived from the sale or ex-
change of property under the Acts prior to 1934.1
This decision seems to establish the conclusion that gains
in connection with life insurance contracts are not to be
treated as capital gains subject to the provisions of Section
117(a) and (b).11 While the retirement of bonds at or be-
fore maturity is not a transaction exactly on all fours with
the payment of amounts on the maturity or surrender of
a life insurance contract, such contracts involve payments
by an obligor upon a contract with a'resulting extinction of
the obligation to the extent therein specified. If the bond
transactions should not be considered sales or exchanges,
insurance transactions should not be. Reference might also
be made to a ruling that the cancellation of notes on the
payment of a consideration by the maker and the return
of the notes to the maker is not a sale or exchange of prop-
erty within Section 117.2 All of these cases have been cited
for the proposition that payment of an obligation accord-
ing to its terms does not involve an exchange or sale of
property under the statutory phrase in Section 117 (a).
The proposition has been based upon the "ordinary" and
"common" meaning of sale and exchange as well as an in-
terpretation of the 1934 enactment of Section 117 (f) as an
addition to the Section rather than a construction of pre-
vious revenue acts.2'
In the decisions holding that gains from "annuity with
death benefit" contracts and life insurance policies are not
included within the language of Section 117(f),22 it was
1934 was a legislative declaration of the meaning of the words "sale"
and "exchange" in prior revenue acts. Committee reports were also
thought to Indicate the result reached.
In United States v. Fairbanks, 95 F. 2d 794 (C.C.A. 9th 1938), it
was held that the redemption of bonds on thirty days notice was not a
sale or exchange under Section 208 of the Revenue Act of 1926, or
Section 101 of the Revenue Act of 1928. This view was affirmed In
Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U. S. 436, 59 S. Ct. 607 (1939).
15 Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U. S. 436, 59 S. Ct. 607 (1939).
19 See note 9, supra.
20 Hale v. Helvering, 85 F. 2d 819, 66 App. D. C. 242, (1936); Felin
v. Kyle, 102 F. 2d 349 (C.C.A. 3d 1939); Binghamn v. Cimmissioner,
105 F. 2d 971 (C.C.A. 2d 1939).
21 Fairbanks v. United States, note 18, supra.
22 Avery v. Commissioner, 111 F. 2d 19 (C.C.A. 9th 1940), (endow-
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pointed out that bonds were distinguished from endowment
and insurance contracts in Section 22, and that if Section
117(f) were applied, the first sentence of Section 22(b)
(2) would be superfluous since the two Sections contain
different formulas for measuring the gain. From this
fact the conclusion was drawn that Congress would have
specifically mentioned endowment contracts and insurance
contracts in Section 117(f) had it been intended to in-
clude them. The limited character of the Section was also
pointed out.
The result would appear to be commendable with respect
to life insurance contracts. Life insurance policies are not
"bonds, debentures, notes," nor are they "evidences of in-
debtedness" issued by any corporation with interest cou-
pons or in registered form. The House Committee Report
states that the Section provides that "amounts received
upon the retirement of corporate bonds and similar evi-
dences of indebtedness shall be considered as amounts re-
ceived in exchange therefor. ''2 4 Although the exclusion of
bond retirements from Section 117 prior to 1935 was based
upon the same reasoning that justified the exclusion of life
insurance policy gains, the specific inclusion of bonds by
the adoption of Section 117(f) did not necessarily carry
with it other types of contracts not specifically mentioned.
While in a certain sense life insurance contracts some-
times are investment contracts and represent an obliga-
tion, they are not the ordinary types of corporate securities
and individual indebtedness to which the statute refers.
2 5
Insurance contracts have been recognized as distinct from
other types of contracts for hundreds of years. Upon the
assignment of insurance contracts the contention that the
gain is taxable under Section 117 would be much more
plausible since there is a transaction similar to a sale, but
ment insurance contract); Cobbs v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 642
(1939) (annuity with death benefit contract).
21 Avery v. Commissioner, note 22, supra.
24 House of Representatives Report No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1934), 1929-1 (Part 2) Cum. Bull. 577.
25 The statute is meant to include only ordinary types of securities of
corporations and individuals of the types specifically mentioned. Gerard
v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 64 (1939); Herder v. -Telvering, 106 F. 2d
153 (App. D. C. 1939).
[VOL.. 2
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an assignment is certainly a different sort of transaction
in end results than surrender or payment at maturity. The
policy behind the Section 6 does not apply to payments at
maturity since a tax will not retard such payments. These
contracts are not subject to increases in values as are other
properties, and are entered into as instruments of saving
combined with insurance protection.
In the cases reaching the above results in connection with
annuity with death benefit contracts, the contracts were
considered as combined insurance and annuity contracts
and not as mere investment contracts. 7 One important
basis for the result in the cases was that the policies were
to be governed by Section 22 as annuity and insurance
policies. But, if, as a government ruling holds, the policies
are neither insurance nor annuity policies, but mere in-
vestment contracts, they do not come within Section 22.11
Would this conclusion concerning the nature of the policies
affect the results of the cases? It is likely that it would not.
The most important arguments for exclusion of gains upon
surrender of insurance policies and annuity policies are
based upon what the scope of Section 117 should be and
not upon an interpretation of Section 22. Thus the prin-
cipal arguments that Section 117 does not govern the in-
surance policy gains also apply to the annuity with death
benefit gains. Whether or not annuity with death benefit
contracts (as well as separate insurance and annuity pol-
icies issued in one transaction) are considered as insurance
or annuity policies within Section 22, the gains realized
upon surrender of such policies should not be brought
within Section 117.
26 "The sale of farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets Is
now seriously retarded by the fact that gains and profits earned over
a series of years are under the present law taxed as a lump sum (and
the amount of surtax greatly enhanced thereby) in the year in which
the profit is realized. Many such sales, with their possible profit taking
and consequent increase of tax revenue, have been blocked by this
feature of the present law. In order to permit such transactions to go
forward without fear of a prohibitive tax, the proposed bill in" section
206 adds a new section . . . " House of Representatives Report No. 350,
67th Cong. 1st Sess. (1921), 1939-1 (Part 1) Cum. Bull. 176.
27 Bodine v. Commissioner, note 9, supra.
28 See note 6, supra.
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2. Treatment of Losses Incurred Under Annuity Con-
tracts.
It has been held in several cases that no loss is incurred
upon the surrender of an insurance policy at an amount
less than the amount of premiums paid upon the policy. In
these cases if there had been a loss it would probably have
been deductible.29 It is said that the cost to be used as a
basis for computing loss is not the entire amount of pre-
miums paid (less dividends). It is held that to take such
entire cost would ignore the fact that the insured has had
insurance protection for the period in which the contract
has been in force, and that the cost of such protection is
necessarily a current cost. Under this view it is said that
premiums collected represent amounts over and above the
current cost of insurance, such amounts being represen-
tated in the reserve value of the contract. This reserve
value is considered the investment or saving element of
the cdntract, being available to the insured upon sur-
render of the contract. The allocation between the cost
of the investment element and the cost of current insurance
protection is then made by taking into account the fact
that the reserve amount represents the amount of the
premiums set aside for future payment by the comp-
any, (the investment element). In the absence of contrary
proof it is presumed that the reserve amount is received
upon surrender and that no loss is incurred because the
amount invested is the amount received. 0 Under this view
it is said that if the entire premiums were taken as cost,
29 London Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F. 2d 230 (C.C.A. 2d 1935),
cert. den., 298 U. S. 663, 56 S. Ct. 747 (1936); Appeal of Standard
Brewing Co., 6 B.T.A. 980 (1927); see I. T. 1944, HI-1 Cum. Bull. 145
(1924). See also Century Wood Preserving Co. v. Commissioner, 69 F. 2d
967 (C.C.A. 3d 1934); Keystone Consolidated Publishing Co. v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 26 B.T.A. 1210 (1952).
30 London Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F. 2d 230 (C.C.A. 2d 1935).
However, In Appeal of Standard Brewing Co., 6 B.T.A. 980 (1927)
and i. T. 1944, I1-1 Cum. Bull. 145 (1924), this point was not mentioned.
In nearly all insurance contracts the surrender value does not equal
the reserve value because of a surrender charge. This charge is in force
at least in the earlier period the policy is In force, and Its size depends
also upon the type of policy involved. If the viewpoint of the taxpayer
[VOL. 2
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there would in effect be a deduction of the cost of the in-
surance protection already received, which deduction
would not otherwise be allowed. 1
In Lucas v. Alexander" it was held that the taxpayer
received a net gain over the 1913 value of the policies
which gain was part of the gain over the entire amount of
premiums that had been paid upon the contract. The gain
over the 1913 value only was held taxable. It was stated
in the decision, however, that under a policy taken out
after 1913 the gain would be the total amounts received
upon the contract less the amount of premiums paid.33
The amount of gain under Section 22(b) (2) is of course
calculated on the basis of the premiums paid. Since this
method of computation of gains is used, it has been held
in one case that the same basis of cost should be taken to
compute losses. 4 Under this case the transaction would be
viewed from the vantage point of the taxpayer, because
is to be ignored and technical insurance analysis is to be resorted to, it
w6uld seem logical to allow at least the difference between the reserve
value and the cash value as a loss. See Paul, STUDIES IN FEDERATION
TAXATION, THIRD SERIES, 408-409 (1940).
In Moses Cohen v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 709 (1941), the taxpayer
was allowed to deduct a loss on account of the fact that full surrender
value of a life insurance contract was not received because of insolv-
ency of the insurance company.
31 See note 53, infra.
32 Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S. 573, 49 S. Ct. 426 (1929).
33 "By the expenditure of $78,100 in premiums, the insured secured
a return of $120,797, resulting in an economic and realized money gain
to him of $42,697. The question of liability for the tax on this gain is
different from that mooted by counsel, but not decided in United States
v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U. S. 189, 194, which was whether
insurance upon the life of a corporate officer, paid at his death to the
corporation, could be constitutionally subjected to a tax on income.
Here the amount paid was not a death benefit or in the nature of a
gift to a beneficiary and was in no sense an indemnity for, or repayment
of, an economic loss suffered by the insured, but was a profit or gain
upon his premium investment, and would seem to be plainly embraced
within the provisions of section 312 taxing 'gains or profits and income
derived from any source whatever' and exempted as such from tax
by any other provision of the act . . . " Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U. S.
573, 576-577, 49 S. Ct. 426 (1929).




he is not concerned with the mechanics of the transaction
from a technical viewpoint. It is said that as far as the
taxpayer is concerned, the receipt of an amount less than
the amount he has paid out is a loss to him?5 While these
arguments have weight the tax authorities apparently in-
sist that no loss is incurred.
The above cases apply to amounts received upon sur-
render before maturity of "insurance with annuity policies"
and "reversionary" annuities (usually not subject to sur-
render, however). They should not apply to "annuity with
death benefit" contracts and insurance policies issued only
with annuity policies, since such transactions are not usual-
ly life insurance transactions.
Likewise, the above cases are not applicable to the taxa-
tion of amounts received upon the surrender of refund an-
nuities and deferred annuities during the deferred per-
iod. 6 Various complications would arise if losses were to be
treated as losses incurred upon surrender of an insurance
policy, but it appears clear that they should not be so
treated.
7
An Income Tax ruling holds that a loss upon surrender
of a refund annuity is an ordinary deductible loss incurred
in a transaction for profit.3 This ruling is justifiable at
least to the extent that it holds a loss occurred. In a refund
annuity the premium represents the cost of the life annuity
or other annuity plus the refund feature. If the refund
feature were treated separately there would hardly ever
35 Dissenting opinion in London Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F. 2d
230 (C.C.A. 2d 1935).
36 A simple deferred annuity would not have a surrender value. Some
policies which appear to be modified deferred annuities do have a
surrender value however. These policies might be classified as "retire-
ment annuities."
In refund annuities where periodical payments are guaranteed and in
annuities certain there is often a provision that the commuted value
of the guaranteed payments may be taken by the annuitant. Usually
there is a surrender charge.
37 See Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts Under Estate
and Inheritance Taxaes, 39 Mich. L. Rev, 856 at 860-872 (1941).
38 I. T. 3567, 1942-2 Cum. Bull. 105. The ruling holds the loss is one in-
curred in a transaction entered into for profit and is not a capital loss.
,See also Atkinson v. Early (E. D., Va.). U72,586 P-H Fed. 1948.
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be a loss,"9 but if the contract were treated as a whole there
would be a loss on account of a surrender charge. 4 This loss
is allowed under the above ruling.
Since no part of the consideration would be allocable to
current insurance the basis for loss would be the entire
consideration from which would be subtracted amounts
already received as annuity payments, plus the amount
received upon surrender.
This amount received upon surrender is often the com-
muted value of the remaining payments on an assumed
rate of interest. If any part of a loss were attributable to
this factor, it might be possible to say that since the pay-
ments themselves were bargained for and their value as
of date of surrender is received, any loss on this account
is not to be taken into consideration.
The question of whether this loss should be considered
as one incurred in a transaction entered into for profit is
considered below. The ruling that the loss is not a capital
loss is consistent with the cases concerning treatment of
gains considered previously.
Since a deferred annuity or a "retirement" annuity is
not to be considered as an insurance policy,4 ' the considera-
tion paid (less any amounts received) would likewise be
the basis for computing any loss which is claimed to be
deductible-"
Other losses than those incurred upon surrender have
been claimed in connection with annuity contracts. Thus an
alleged loss may be claimed upon the termination of a life
or temporary annuity contract by the termination of the
39 In Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 135 F. 2d 596 (C.C.A. 2d 1943),
a refund annuity is divided by the court into its annuity and refund
features for the purposes of deciding the issues in that case. Except
for the particular type of fact situation considered in that case there
appears to be no warrant for separating the refund and annuity features
of a refund contract in most tax situations. Such features can be sep-
arated in several ways or on several theories with resultant theoretical
cost differences in each case as to the cost of the annuity and of the
refund feature.
40 See note 36, supra.
41 Note 37, supra.
42 There is often no surrender charge during the latter part of the
deferred period and therefore no loss.
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measuring life before the life expectancy period has term-
inated although the original cost may have been recovered
in the periodical payments. 43 A loss might also be claimed
under such contracts at the death of the annuitant upon
the ground that the annuitant has not received the con-
sideration paid for the contract. 4 Should the annuitant
cease to make payments under a deferred annuity contract
and forfeit the amounts paid in, he may attempt to estab-
lish a deductible loss.
4"
The first major case to arise was Louis v. Helvering.
6
On April 19, 1913, the taxpayer had entered into a will
settlement in which she promised to give up her right under
the will in return for an annuity for the lifetime of her
mother. The mother died three years before the end of her
life expectancy. The taxpayer claimed that the difference
between the stipulated value of the annuity based upon the
life expectancy of the mother as of April 19, 1913, and the
commuted value of the payments actually received as of
such date was a deductible loss. The loss which was claimed
was therefore the difference between the supposed cost of
the annuity and the value of the annuity as of the date
when granted, determined by the actual length of the
mother's life. The result of this contention was that al-
though the taxpayer actually received in periodical pay-
ments a total amount greater than the value of the annuity
as of April 19, 1913, she was claiming a loss because she
did not receive payments to the end of the life expectancy
period of the measuring life. In addition to a general crit-
icism that the calculations of the tax payer were entirely
theoretical, the Court said that since the amount of the
In the case of all these annuity and insurance charges it should be
noted that there may be no loss in particular cases because of reduction
of cost by reason of unreported dividends declared and received in
participating policies.
43 Helvering v. Louis, 64 App. D. C. 263, 77 F. 2d 386 (1935), re-
versing 29 B.T.A. 1200 (1934).
44 Industrial Trust Co. v. 3roderick, 94 F. 2d 927 (C.C.A. 1st 1938),
affirming 19 F. Supp. 961 (D.C., R.T, 1937) cert. den. 304 U. S.
572, 58 S. Ct. 1040 (1938).
45 George M. Cohan v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 743 (1938).
46 Cited note 43, mupra.
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value of the contract had been recovered in payments there
was no loss. The statutes, decisions, and rulings were cited
to the effect that taxable gain is realized under an annuity
contract when the total amounts received exceed the cost
of the annuity.
The case therefore decided that a loss based upon the
difference between the actual amounts received and the
amounts that would have been received had the annuitant
lived out his life expectancy is not a loss at all for the pur-
pose of the income tax, provided the amount of the original
cost basis has been received. More specifically the difference
between the value of the contract based upon the life ex-
pectancy of the measuring life and the commuted value of
the payments actually received (as of the date when the
contract is issued) cannot be considered a loss. These con-
clusions appear satisfactory.
The case seems more important here, however, because
of the language used by the Court when it said, "At the
date of the annuity contract the taxpayer had no assurance
from any source that her mother would live for the full
period of her expectancy as calculated by the mortality
tables. The taxpayer accepted the contract upon the basis
of its terms which assured her of the payment of the an-
nuity for the actual period of her mother's life and not for
the period of her supposed expectancy. Had the contract
stipulated for a payment of $5,000 a year for 15 years, 1
month, and 9 days, a default of payment for the first 3
years, 1 month, and 9 days of that period would have
caused a loss computable upon a different basis than now
obtains in this case. But the contract as executed was not
for the payment of the annuity for a fixed term of years,
but only for the period of her mother's life.
''47
This language although unnecessary to the decision was
seized upon by the government to support its argument in
Industrial Trust Co. v. Broderick that there was no loss
when the annuitant died before the consideration paid for a
life annuity contract had been recovered, and was recog-
nized as a ground of decision in that case." The result in
47 Helvering v. Louis, 64 App. D. C. 263, 77 F. 2d 387, 387-388 (1935).
4S Cited note 43, supra. See also I. T. 2915, XIV-2 Cum. Bull., 98 (1935).
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the Industrial Trust Co. case was in addition based upon
the proposition that there was no deductible loss in any
event because the transaction was not entered into for
profit. Since there are alternative grounds for the decision
and the Court was hesitant in adopting the argument that
there was no loss, the case may not be an authority squarely
in point.
Whether the result suggested in this case is desirable
depends in part on the nature of annuity contracts in so far
as the income tax is concerned. If a life annuity contract is
conceived to be the purchase of an income for life and is
to be distinguished from other types of capital assets,
49
periodical payments under the contract constitute pay-
ments of income under the Sixteenth Amendment. Thus it
could be said that even though Congress has seen fit to tax
part of such income and has as a matter of policy allowed
the taxpayer to recover the cost of his contract if he lives
to the requisite age, it does not follow that there was any in-
tention that cost was to be the basis for computing loss. Any
loss would not be a loss of capital but would rather be a
loss of expected income which would certainly not support
a statutory deduction of any kind. The loss would therefore
be compared to a loss of expected profit.0
On the other hand if no constitutional gain is realized
until cost is recovered, a consistent position would make
necessary the use of cost as the basis for computing loss.
Such loss would not be automatically deductible, but there
would at least be a basis for loss. Inasmuch as gains under
annuity contracts are treated on the theory that cost may
be recovered, it might also be argued that cost should be
recovered here also. It could be said that the situation is
to be regarded as an investment situation in view of the
Congressional treatment.
49 Bee Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts Under Fed-
Income Tax, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 1005 at 1009-1019 (1942). Bee also Egtvedt
v. U. S. (Ct. of Claims) ff72,602 P-H Fed. 1948.
50 A failure of profit is not an occasion for a statutory deduction. See
Taylor v. Commissioner, 34 13.T.A. 241 (1936); Paul, Randolph E.,
Studies in Federal Taxation, Third Series, p. 409 (1940) and Hort v.
Commissioner, 313 U. S. 28, 61 S. Ct. 757 (1941).
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The Board of Tax Appeals has held that a loss is incurred
when the annuitant ceases making premium payments upon
a deferred annuity contract and forfeits the amounts paid
in." Apparently the Board in this case did not take the
view that the annuitant has received what he has paid for,
or that he has merely lost income. The case seems contrary
to the above cases.
A distinction suggested in the Industrial Trust Co. case
in the lower Court is the difference between a contract
which is carried out according to its terms and a contract
which is broken. On this basis, the contract has not been
broken but has been terminated by the action of one of the
parties. The loss might be compared to a loss upon the
abandonment of intangible properties. 2 It could also be
urged that it is similar to that incurred because of a sur-
render charge. No part of the consideration has been used
concretely in favor of the annuitant.
Additional arguments, however, appear to support the
Industrial Trust Co. case. In a deferred annuity situation
the annuitant has paid the consideration for the right to
receive an annuity in the future upon continued payment
of premiums. In a sense, therefore, he has received what
he bargained for. Again it could also be argued that all that
would ever accrue to the annuitant under the contract
would be income, and that only the right to future income
is lost. These considerations would not be applicable when
there are options to take the proceeds in other ways than
by annuity payment plans. The Industrial Trust Co. case
does not appear inconsistent with the ruling that a loss
may be incurred in surrender of an annuity contract, al-
though there is some doubt here. In any event provisions
regarding losses from wagering contracts would not be
applicable.53
51 Cohan case, note 45, supra.
52 Paul and Mertens, The Law of Federal Income Taxation, 324
(1934).
53 section 23 (h) of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE provides: "Losses
from wagering transactions shall be allowed only to the extent of the
gains from such transactions." An annuity contract is not a wagering
contract. Hult v. Home Life Ins. Co., 213 Ia. 890, 240 N. W. 218 (1932);
Rishel v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 78 F. 2d 88 (C.C.A. 10th 1935).
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It thus appears that losses on surrender and losses on
termination of a contract by death of an annuitant are
treated differently. But there is support for the position
that the second type of loss should be allowed. The above
remarks would also apply when the annuitant dies before
maturity of deferred period.
In all of the above situations cost should be the basis of
loss if the conclusion is reached that there is a loss and
that the loss is deductible. There would be no question of
the cost of current insurance.
A loss has also been claimed in favor of a refund an-
nuitant upon his death. The refund was to be paid to a
named beneficiary. The Board of Tax Appeals held that
the case came within the Industrial Trust Co. case. It also
said that the loss of the payments beyond those guaranteed
was a loss of future profit or income.*
Even if it were conceded that there is a loss upon sur-
render of a contract, upon the death of an annuitant, or
upon the forfeiture of a deferred annuity, the question still
remains whether the loss is deductible.
If the loss were not connected with a business, the main
question would be whether the contract was entered into
for profit.5" This question is confused to some extent with
the question of whether there was any loss at all. Four
Other claims for deductions in connection with annuity contracts can
be made, although not in connection with payments made under the
provisions of the contract. The premiums paid for life insurance contracts
and annuity contracts would ordinarily be considered personal expenses
and not deductible. See. 24(a), Regulations Il, Sec. 19.24-1; 0. D. 48,
1 C.B. 160 (1919); 0. D. 243, 1 C.B. 160 (1919); 0. D. 828, 4 C. B. 208
(1921). However, if the payment of premiums on insurance policies can
be considered a business expense and the person who has paid the
premiums is nut the beneficiary of the contract, the premiums may be
deductible. See Taxation Affecting Life Insurance, Prentice-Hall, pp.
73, 40-49 (1938); Montgomery, Robert H., Federal Income Tax Hand-
book, pp. 408-410 (1935); 401 C.C.H. 2024-2028.
54 Lambert v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 802 (1939).
55 Section 23 (e) of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE states: "In computing
net income there shall be allowed as deductions: . . . (e) Losses by
individuals. - In the case of an individual, losses sustained during the
taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise ...
2. if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit though
not connected with the trade or business: . , ."
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cases and one ruling appear pertinent to commercial an-
nuity transactions. In a case concerning a deferred an-
nuity forfeiture, the Board held that under the particular
facts involved, there was a transaction for profit.56 The
Board relied partly upon the fact that the taxpayer aban-
doned his contract upon the advice of his lawyer that it
was "unprofitable." In Cohen v. Commissioner,7 the tax-
payer surrendered policies to the successor of an original
bankrupt insurance company for new policies and received
less than the surrender value because of the lien arising
from the bankruptcy. In a divided decision it was held that
the insurance transaction was a transaction for profit and
that the loss was deductible. The Board relied on the gen-
eral nature of an insurance policy (other than term insur-
ance policies). It was pointed out that there was an "in-
vestment" element, the reserve, which drew interest, some-
what like a bank account, and that the policy also partici-
pated in dividends. But it, was also stated that the part of
cost that could be attributed to current insurance protec-
tion amounted to personal expense, although that question
was not involved. In the Industrial Trust Co. case it was
held that there was no loss, but if there were such loss, it
was not deductible.
Finally in the ruling concerning surrender losses it
was held that the loss was incurred in a transaction for
profit and this view was followed in a recent District
Court Case. 7a It is usually held that whether a particular
transaction is entered into for profit depends upon the
particular facts of the case. 8 In both the Cohen and Indus-
trial Trust Co. cases all that was taken into account was
the nature of the contract. In the Cohen case the Board of
Tax Appeals emphasized the investment and profit seeking
side of the contract and disregarded the insurance protect-
tion features. On the other hand the Court in the latter
case emphasized the "security" or "insurance" side of the
transaction there considered.
56 Cohan case, cited note 45, supra.
57 44 B.T.A. 709 (1941).
57aI.T. 3567, 1942-2 C.B. 105; Atkinson v. Early (E.D., Va.) P72,586
P-1- Fed. 1948.
55 The purpose or motive of the taxpayer depending on all of the cir-
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For the present, however, the above mentioned ruling
settles the matter. It apparently relies on the inherent na-
ture of a refund annuity transaction and thus applies to
all losses under annuity transactions.
Nevertheless it would be possible to confine its scope in
the future to surrender transactions on the ground that
there is no particular reason to emphasize either the "in-
vestment" side of the transaction or the "security" or "in-
surance" side. It would be possible to take the following
approach. In the Industrial Trust Co. case the Court relied
on the nature of a life annuity but at the same time dis-
tinguished the Cohen case on its facts. It would seem proper
to assume that the primary function of a life annuity is
to provide financial security during the life of the an-
nuitant and to conclude that such a contract is not entered
into for profit in the absence of facts showing any motive
on the part of the taxpayer. But if the taxpayer could show
that he had a profit motive because of some special circum-
stance, then the loss could be considered deductible.
Losses in connection with refund annuities-such as
losses upon surrender (when commuted value of guaran-
teed payments are paid-less a surrender charge)-are
not different because of the nature of such a contract. It
might be urged that the most the annuitant has absolutely
contracted for on the face of the contract is a return of his
original investment.
On the other hand "annuity with death benefit" contracts
and transactions in which insurance policies will be issued
only with the issuance of an annuity policy would appear
to be similar to bank accounts because the purchaser has
contracted for a gain that is sure to result. In the case of
these contracts, the element of profit taking is more likely
to appear since no insurance annuity element will be in-
volved unless the life insurance feature may be surrendered
separately and is so surrendered.
cumstances is the crux of the inquiry. E. v!. Carnick, 21 B.T.A. 12
(1930). See also Lihme v. Anderson, 18 F. Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y.
1936); Farish v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 1114 (1937), reversed 103
2d 63 (C.C.A. 5th 1939), and cases cited in Cohen v. Commissioner,
note 57, supra,
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3. The Taxation of Gains and Losses in Connection with
the Assignment of Annuity Policies for a Valuable Con-
sideration.
Section 22(b) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code con-
tains the only language of the income tax statute dealing
specifically with the taxation of gains in connection with
assignment of insurance policies and annuity contracts. It
reads, "In the case of a transfer for a valuable consider-
ation, by assignment or otherwise, of a life insurance,
endowment, or annuity contract, or any interest therein,
only the actual value of such consideration and the amount
of the premiums and other sums subsequently paid by the
transferee shall be exempt from taxation under paragraph
(1) of this paragraph. The preceding sentence shall not
apply in the case of such transfer if such contract or inter-
est therein has a basis for determining gain or loss in the
hands of a transferee determined in whole or in part by
reference to such basis of such contract or interest therein
in the hands of the transferor ..",9
The application of the statute to annuity payments re-
ceived by the transferee under annuity contracts involves
no difficult problems. Usually the above provision governs
with the qualification that the consideration for the trans-
fer plus premiums subsequently paid by the transferee are
to be used in place of the original consideration paid for
the contract by the transferor.0 The transferee is thus
allowed to recover only his own cost by the three per cent
method.
The arbitrary character of the statutory scheme of Sec-
59 Section 22(b) (2), INTERNAL REVENUE CODE. With the exception of
the last sentence, this provision first appeared in Sec. 213(b) (2) of
the REVENUE ACT of 1926. The section also provides for special treat-
ment of annuity payments under a contract purchased by a husband for
his wife to settle alimony obligations. See Section 22(k), INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE.
The last sentence of Section 22(b) (2) quoted above is primarily
operative when there is a tax free exchange or a transfer of the policy
by virtue of a corporate reorganization.
60 A letter of a Deputy Commissioner, however, states that an assign-
ment to the insured is not to be treated as an assignment for a valuable
consideration. 464 C.C.H. f 6259. The prior sentences will apply.
See I. T. 3212, XVII-2, Cum. Bull. 65 (1938).
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tion 22 (b) (2) is illustrated here. It seems to indicate that
the assignment shall be in part treated as a sale, the exemp-
tion being based on the cost to the transferee.
Insofar as an original purchaser is concerned the Section
was enacted on the basis that the original purchaser re-
ceives a certain return of interest upon his money which is
allocable to each payment because the insurance company
in calculating the premiums takes a certain rate of -inter-
est into account. This is the basic idea of the three per cent
method. But the consideration paid upon an assignment
might not have any direct relation to tables used by the
insurance company or to any calculations of the company.
Therefore the scheme of the statute based upon such calcu-
lations does not seem to have any necessary relation to the
return on the investment of the transferee. In other words
here there is no assurance whatsoever that the transferee
will receive his capital plus interest at the end of the life
expectancy period of the annuitant, because the considera-
tion paid for the contract will be fixed with several other
possible factors in view as well."
A special problem arises when an insurance contract is
again transferred by the transferee but not for a valuable
consideration and proceeds are received upon the death of
the insured. The question in such case is whether the pro-
ceeds are exempt under Section 22(b) (1) or are taxable
by virtue of the last sentence of Section 22(b) (2) under
that Section. It has been held that the transferee's basis
is the basis for taxation.62 In the case of an annuity con-
tract, however, or an insurance contract under which pro-
ceeds are payable other than upon the death of the insured,
the problem would be raised whether the original consider-
61 Considerations pertaining to the individual concerning his health,
mental well-being, etc. might enter into the picture on the assignment
of an annuity for a valuable consideration.
62 Hacker v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 659 (1937); see, however, T.T.
3212, XVII-2 Cum. Bull. 65 (1938). The situation would be different
if the original transfer were made under circumstances making original
transferor taxable. See last paragraph of note 67. There is also a
possibility that the assignment might involve gift tax liability and not
income tax liability. See Pritchard v. Commissioner, 3 C.C.H. T.C.M.
1125 (1944), noted 58 Harv. L. R. 284 (1944). See also Paul Studies in
Federal Taxation, Third Series; pp. 364-365 (1940).
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ation is taken as the donee's cost or whether the consider-
ation paid for the contract by the first transferee (the
second transferor) is to be used in calculating the tax.
There are no rulings concerning this situation, but if such
a case arises the government could claim the original cost
should be used if that position appears favorable.
For the above clause to apply, the transfer must be for
a valuable consideration and not merely for love and affec-
tion. A commercial or sale situation must be indicated. If
no such consideration is present, then the first part of
Section 22(b) (2) would apply by its terms, and the an-
nuity payments would be considered just as if they were
payments under a gift annuity."
Taxation of gains realized upon assignment by the trans-
feror is a subject not disposed of easily. In the case of in-
surance and annuity contracts, the statute would not spec-
ifically cover the taxation of gains because it treats spec-
ifically of amounts received "under life insurance or en-
dowment contracts." 4 Here the amounts are received upon
the sale or exchange of the policies. And the transferor
appears taxable to the extent that the amounts he received
upon the transfer exceed the amounts paid for the con-
tract, less amounts received tax-free prior to the transfer.
Furthermore, the gain, if any, could be said to be taxable
gain under Section 117 (a) because it is realized upon the
sale or exchange of a capital asset. 5 The result would be
that an avenue of evasion is opened under certain types of
contracts for a policy holder who is the beneficiary. He
could transfer the policy just prior to the maturity date,
or before any surrender of it, and would be enabled to ob-
tain the benefit of the capital gains provision which he
could not otherwise obtain.
In relation to insurance policies often confused with an-
6 3 See Paul, Studies in Feficral Taxatio, Third Series, pp. 365-367
(1940) in regard to insurance policies and Regulation Mlu, Sec. 22(b)
(2)-3.
64 Section 22(b) (2), note 7, supra.
65 Thus prior to the enactment in 1934 of Section 117(f) it was pos-
sible to transfer bonds for a consideration and obtain the benefit of
section 117, although upon retirement of the bonds that section was
held not to apply. McKee v. Commissioner, 35 B.TA. 239 (1937).
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nuity contracts, the above method of taxation is inconsist-
ent with the treatment of losses upon surrender of such
contracts. The gain would be computed upon the basis of
cost, but such cost could be said not to be the amount of
premiums paid for the contract but the reserve value of the
contract upon the reasoning examined in the loss cases. If
the cost of earned insurance is not to be included in the loss
cases, it certainly should not be included here. Losses like-
wise would be figured upon the basis of the reserve value
of the contract, for the cases treated losses upon assign-
ment exactly as losses upon surrender, in so far as the basis
for computing loss is concerned. 7
4. The Taxation of Dividends.
Ordinarily annuity contracts such as immediate life
annuities, refund annuities, survivorship annuities and the
more simple forms of deferred annuities are not participat-
ing contracts and the question of the taxation of dividends
will not arise. Within the last few years, however, some of
these types have been issued as participating. "Retire-
ment" contracts usually are participating.
Under any contracts which are considered life insurance
or endowment contracts, dividends received in cash are
not taxable in so far as other amounts received under the
66 See note 29, supra.
This discussion relates to so-called annuity contracts which can be
considered life insurance contracts, (such as insurance with annuity
contracts) which are assigned before maturity.
67 Century Wood Preserving Co. v, Commissioner, 69 F. 2d 967 (C.
C.A. 3d 1934); Keystone Consolidated Publishing Co. v. Commissioner,
26 B.T.A. 1210 (1932). Cases concerning gift tax valuation are not
directly in point, because the question there involved is the value of the
contract when the gift is made. See Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U. S.
254, 61 S. Ct. 507 (1941); Powers v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 259, 61
S. Ct. 509 (1941); United States v. Ryerson, 312 U, S. 260, 61 S. Ct,
479 (1941).
Another problem somewhat related to the transfer of annuity con-
tracts for a valuable consideration is the problem of the taxation of the
transferor when a policy has been transferred as a gift or the annuitant
is a donee annuitant. This problem is similar to that mentioned in
Melsenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts, 40 Mich. L. Rev. 1005,
p, 1023 (1942). If the purchaser or assignor of a contract retains
power to change a beneficiary or to surrender the contract, he may be
taxable.
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contract plus the dividends do not exceed the consideration
paid. If the consideration paid has been received back,
amounts received as dividends are taxable."
However, in the case of contracts which are annuity
contracts and which cannot be considered life insurance or
endowment contracts, the taxation of dividends received
presents a problem. There are no rulings or decisions. In
the case of dividends which may be credited against cur-
rent premiums, amounts received are not subject to tax
until the total of all amounts received tax-free equals the
consideration paid. 9 Where annuity contracts are concern-
ed, however, this rule would appear to apply only to divi-
dends received during the deferred period under deferred
annuity contracts where the consideration is payable in
installments. It has no application to immediate annuity
contracts, and the amounts received under these contracts
would not be amounts received under insurance or endow-
ment contracts within Section 22(b) (2) if such contracts
were not supplementary contracts.70
It might be possible to treat the payment of such divi-
dends as part of the annuity payments received and tax the
60 Dividends are "Amounts received (other than amounts paid by
reason of the death of the insured and interest payments on such
amounts and other than amounts received as annuities) under a life
insurance or endowment contract," Sec. 22(b) (2). See T. D. 2137,
17 Int. Rev. Treas. Decs. 49 (1915), 0. D. 490, 2 C. B. 85 (1920); 0. D.
433, 2 C. B. 91 (1920). This treatment is accorded dividends in many of
the rulings cited in footnotes concerning treatment of other proceeds
received during the life of the insured.
Article 22(a)-12, Regulations III, is also applicable. It provides:
"Amounts received as a return of premiums paid under life insurance,
endowment, or annuity contracts, and the so-called 'dividend' of a
mutual insurance company which may be credited against the current
premium, are not subject to tax."
Interest on accumulated dividends is taxable. Special ruling of Septem-
ber 22, 1941, by Deputy Commissioner, 413 C. C. H. q 6505. See also
special ruling of February 16, 1943, 433 C.C.H. 1 6218, and I. T.
3413, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 58.
69 See note 68, supra.
70 The first sentence of Section 22(b)(2) of the INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE states: "Amounts received (other than . . . ) under a life insur-
ance or endowment contract . . . " The second sentence covers "amounts
received as an annuity under an annuity contract . . . "
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entire periodical amounts received in accordance with the
three per cent method. Although such treatment is not
specifically authorized under the statute as now written,
this method is similar to that prescribed prior to 1934 and
could therefore be said to be justified by the history of the
present provision concerning annuity contracts.7'
But the fact remains that this type of dividend payment
is not exempted from taxation at all under Section 22 (b)
(2) as it now stands. Furthermore, such dividends are a
return on investment and can be compared to dividends on
ordinary stock or to interest. Participating annuity con-
tracts provide for a fixed annuity payment plus dividend
payment and there is ordinarily no practical problem of
determining what part of an amount received is received
as a dividend.
The above discussion also applies to dividends received
under "annuity with death benefit" contracts except that
in the case of these contracts the regulation concerning
dividends under annuity contracts is not even applicable
and it seems that any and all dividends received should be
taxable just as the periodical payments are.-
It might also be noted that Article 22 (a) -12 of the Reg-
ulations favors the taxpayer in so far as it applies to div-
idends received during the deferred period under install-
ment "retirement" annuities and even to dividends received
during the deferred period under simple installment defer-
red annuities with no refund or death benefit provisions
during the deferred period. Dividends received under these
circumstances are not amounts exempted from taxation
under Section 22(b) (2) and no good reason appears for
exemption of such amounts by virtue of Article 22(a) -12.
In these situations it appears that an option to apply the
dividends to reduce the premiums paid should not determine
the nature of the dividends as income. Such an option is
only one of various options usually offered. If the actual
71 The REVENUE ACTS from 1926 to 1932 exempted "Amounts received
* . - under a life insurance, endowment, or annuity contract . . . " etc.
72 This comment would also apply to annuity and life Insurance con-
tracts when they are issued together pursuant to rules of the insurance
company, at least until the insurance contract has been surrendered.
The entire amounts received would be taxed here.
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character of the dividend is examined, it will be seen that
they arise from the surplus of the company which exists
because of unanticipated returns on investments of the
insurance company, death rates experienced different from
those indicated by mortality tables used, savings in loading
expenses, gains from surrender or lapse of policies, etc.73
The nature of the dividends thus appears clearly to be a
return on investment. Again an analogy could be made to
corporate dividends or to interest.
5. Conclusion.
Recent cases and rulings relating to the subject matter
of the previous article on income taxation of annuity con-
tracts have not been considered in detail. A revision of that
article would be primarily a rehash. But it is clearly indica-
ted by all the rulings and cases in this field that uncertainty
still exists as to.proper methods for taxing various types of
gains and losses under the present income tax statute.
This small segment of the income taxation field presents
a miniature picture of a typical situation in income taxa-
tion. Broad general. statutory clauses were enacted ap-
parently without sufficient consideration of detailed prob-
lems involved in the technical subject matter covered. Scat-
tered attempts to avoid taxation (or to reduce tax payable)
have resulted in scattered and often inconsistent Income
Tax rulings. Cases taken to court have established further
inconsistent and confused bases for taxation.
Interest of the public in annuity contracts in spite of an
economic situation adverse to sale of such contracts means,
however, that interest in the income taxation of these con-
tracts will continue. As a result further rulings and cases
can be expected to settle some of the present problems.
Nevertheless general clarification can be and should be
attained by revision of provisions of the statute and regu-
lations relating to annuity transactions.
73 Heubner, S. S. Life Insurance, 337-338 (1935).
